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PAMELA BANTING
From Beowulf through Virginia Woolf
to the Coastal Wolves of British Columbia:
Animals, Interdisciplinarity and
the Environmental Humanities

Animals are good to think, as Claude Lévi-Strauss wrote, but for the most part universities are
dominated by a single suborder: simians. And simians who also happen to be humanists (and by
humanists I am referring not only to those in Humanities faculties but to the professoriate at
large) can be resistant to discourses about species other than our own, except in faculties,
departments, and sub-disciplines such as biology, ethology, primatology, or veterinary science.
If, as John Berger has argued, other-than-human animals can no longer return the human gaze,
is it equally true or a simple corollary that humanists cannot return the gaze of the animal?
Theorizing ‘the animal’ from within an English department can meet with additional obstacles.
Within such a context, animals (if they are thought of at all) are almost always treated as
symbolic. In his essay “Poetic Animals and Animal Souls,” Randy Malamud writes: “In Western
culture, generally, interest in animals rings hollow. It is rote or symbolic, possessing a
diminutive cultural currency. Animals and animal imagery are ubiquitous, but the importance
we accord them is shallow. Politically, aesthetically, and sociologically, animals are perpetually
subaltern” (269). To me, symbolic animals are less good to think than the animate ones.
Ironically, English departments are both architecturally and functionally modelled along the
lines of a zoo or a natural history collection, stocked as they are with two or three
representative ‘specimens’ per literary period, ranging from Beowulf to Virginia Woolf and
beyond. Some of the specimens, the professors, have individual rooms with a view while
others, sessional instructors and graduate students, are often housed in shared internal spaces
with no view and no natural light. The creatures best adapted to the small cages and artificial
light and routines thrive while some others, like the tiger or the hyena at the zoo, can end up
pacing back and forth in psychological disarray.
In the classroom, teaching texts about animals is often inflected by the fact that many
contemporary urban students seem to have had a fairly limited range of experiences of wild
animals. The point Robert Michael Pyle makes in his essay “A Local Connection”—that with
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local extirpations or extinctions of species comes a corresponding extinction of human
experience—seems to be borne out in the classroom. For some students, their primary and
often their sole referent for live animals is their family pet, so much so that some find it difficult
to put him or her into the background while we read texts about wild animals. In a graduate
seminar I taught, one student decided that it would be a great idea to deliver his entire seminar
presentation from the point of view of a paper bag puppet representing his dog. Even while
reading philosophy, theory, fiction, nonfiction, and poetry about wild animals, he seemed
almost helpless to set the family dog aside for a while.
Another challenge comes in doing interdisciplinary work without having been trained in
interdisciplinary methodologies. Although many Canadian universities have adopted
interdisciplinarity as a pillar or post of their mandate (such metaphors are often architectural
and privilege the built as opposed to the natural world), they seldom provide tangible support
for such work. In my observation from within a former Faculty of Humanities (now Arts),
interdisciplinary research is often interpreted to mean work within a single discipline but
carried out across a couple of different languages, not work that actually traverses disciplines.
Faculty with genuinely interdisciplinary degrees and research tend to be regarded as neither
fish nor fowl by those with more traditional degrees.
At times epistemological divides can seem like yawning and slippery glacial crevasses. In their
essay “Hybrid Vigor: Interbreeding Cultural Studies and Human-Animal Studies,” Annie Potts
and Philip Armstrong discuss the interdisciplinary potential of hybridizing cultural studies and
human-animal studies. They encapsulate the differences between cultural studies and scientific
methodologies:
One of the main challenges in teaching and learning CS [Cultural Studies] is the depth
and durability of the split between scientific and humanistic forms of knowledge.
Humanities disciplines place a high value on interpretive, speculative, critical, analytic,
textual, and historiographical work. In contrast, the sciences and social sciences seek to
reduce the speculative and interpretive elements of knowledge production in favor of
the accumulation and analysis of empirical data according to more or less orthodox
methodological protocols that are designed to eliminate interpretive variables. CS seeks
to span this major epistemological divide. (8-9)
My own research over the past several years has been on literary nonfiction by park wardens
and former guides and outfitters who became environmental activists. Writing about texts by
Andy Russell, Charlie Russell, Sid Marty, Karsten Heuer, and others has presented me with
trepidations I have seldom encountered in any of my other research. Partly as a result of such
difficulties, along with the general neglect in Canadian universities both of animals and of
literary nonfiction other than life writing by and about simians, little to no scholarly work has
been published on books by writers who have spent vast amounts of time outside in wilder
places. As a result, in most cases, one is starting from scratch, though this can be both a
disadvantage and an advantage.
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Working in ecocriticism and animal studies can induce an entirely novel form of the anxiety of
authorship. Having done my doctorate on the history and milieu of the long poem, and then
having made a very deep and broad foray into ecocriticism, I ask myself a lot of questions as I
venture again and again into examining literary nonfiction about grizzly bears, black bears,
wolves, whales, tigers, cougars, and salmon. Unfortunately, the high school I attended was too
small and had too few resources to hire a biology teacher. Because I lacked any high school
courses in biology, when I went to university the only science credit I was allowed to take was
Earth and Planetary Sciences (Rocks and Stars). Because I lack any training in biology, one
significant risk is that, even with extensive research, I might write something truly stupid about
animals. The spectre of personal and professional embarrassment rears its ugly head. However,
I take both caution and consolation from poet and essayist Gary Snyder who writes that
“Perhaps one should not talk (or write) too much about the wild world: it may be that it
embarrasses other animals to have attention called to them” (21).
Compounding one’s fears of making serious errors is the fear of theorizing about such animals
on the basis of one’s own relatively scant experience with them. Bracketing childhood visits to
the nuisance grounds to watch the black bears plough through human garbage, my own
personal encounters with bears tally so far at three black bears and one grizzly. How can such a
person possibly do justice to accounts of bears by people whose bear experiences and
encounters number in the thousands of hours? By what right and with what credentials exactly
do I analyze these writers’ texts? What if I lead myself or someone else astray with regard to
these occasionally dangerous creatures as I move across areas of research involving philosophy,
literary theory, textual analysis, biology, psychology, anthropology, and semiotics?
Further amplifying individual, cultural and species blind spots, I would suggest that researchers’
natural fears of large predators like tigers, bears, and wolves may infiltrate such work. It can be
difficult to think ‘objectively’ about a tiger that kills and eats a poor Russian peasant, even a
poacher, as in John Vaillant’s The Tiger: A True Story of Vengeance and Survival or a grizzly that
half-kills a couple of hikers because it thinks they are competition for its food cache as in
Patricia Van Tighem’s The Bear’s Embrace: A True Story of Surviving a Grizzly Bear Attack. Such
narratives remind us powerfully of our own animality and even, in such cases, of our status as
potential prey. These are not feelings or responses with which one usually has to contend while
working on the lyric, the dramatic monologue, or the Petrarchan sonnet. Texts about grizzly
bears and Amur tigers require that analysis be monitored to guard against blind species loyalty
and personal dread. While ethics and etiquette, along with FOIP legislation and Ethics Review
Boards, may protect members of vulnerable groups when it comes to researchers writing about
human Others, where is the safety net for animals when it comes to informed, fair, and nonexploitative representations of more-than-human others? Unconscious processes such as
projection and transference are not out of the question just because a text is about a morethan-human animal, and they can be particularly difficult to detect, identify, and take into
account.
There are also conundrums when one attempts to theorize animal subjectivity and points of
view. For example, while working on an article about Sid Marty’s nonfiction book The Black
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Grizzly of Whiskey Creek, many chapters of which are written as if from one of two bears’ points
of view, one of the nodes I wanted to explore was bears’ olfactory sensibilities in relation to
sense of place. Other than Marty’s own text, it was difficult to find research beyond the
statistical about bears’ sense of smell, but I found some delectable research material on
humans’ sense of smell. Applying what I found on humans’ senses of smell would not be
appropriate, however, given that bears can out-sniff humans by an exponential factor and their
ideas of what smells good (e.g. carrion, rotting garbage, outhouses) are generally the opposite
of what humans find appealing.
The outpouring of recent research on the ontology and epistemology of more-than-human
animals has taken us a long way toward increased understanding of our fellow creatures’ lives.
However, explorations of such animals’ own being and knowledge (and not just our
relationships with and knowledge of them) often run aground on the shoals of charges of
anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism. If a more-than-human animal trait is one shared
with humans, then contrary to logic and common sense that trait is often regarded either as
exclusively human or one that it is simply impossible to know animals share. As Marcus Bullock
writes, “That steadfast refusal to see expressiveness anywhere [other than in humans] merely
becomes another species of anthropomorphism, should we turn so intently against the other
temptation as to insist on hearing only silence and seeing only empty matter in the language of
animal forms” (112). While in many instances human intentions and human emotions can also
only be inferred and sometimes too they can seem incomprehensible or bizarre (I would add
that it is another form of anthropocentrism to hold as one’s premise that the psyches of other
humans are understood), nevertheless more-than-human animals typically function as a limitcase when it comes to ontology and epistemology: we do not and cannot know anything about
their umwelten. Or, to put it another way, there be dragons.
But one of the most daunting, though exhilarating, challenges for the animal studies researcher
is the fact that every species is distinct and plays a different role in the ecosystem in which that
species lives. Moving in one’s research from, say, the poetry of one writer to that of another—
even across national borders or historical timelines or from critical studies in poetry to a focus
on fiction—is not as time-intensive or intimidating a transition as that of spending a few years
working on grizzly bear narratives and then switching to narratives about wolves. Doing a lot of
research on bears leaves one more or less completely unprepared to work on a text about
wolves.
When Western-educated humans think about more-than-human animals we tend to think of
them in terms of their unique identifying traits: their physical appearance and a set of observed
and scientifically validated characteristics and behaviours. We think of them occupying specific
habitats or ecological niches and going about their utilitarian business—being born and raised,
leaving the burrow or nest, and then reproducing and raising their own young in turn—within
the confines of ranges that supply no more than the essentials of life. That is, as any field guide
or nature documentary demonstrates, we tend to think of other animals’ lives and occupancy
of the earth mostly as restricted to maintaining access to the simple, bare necessities of water,
food, safety, shelter, and reproduction. In terms of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, we reserve
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“sense of belonging” and other higher needs for ourselves: we seldom think of animals as
having a sense of belonging or a sense of place. Anthropocentrism is operant too in this
tendency of ours to think of more-than-human animals solely in terms of relatively abstract
notions such as space, habitat, range, territory, and ecological niche but not in terms of their
having a sense of place, even though it is probable that most non-human animals have a far
greater knowledge of the particularities of their respective territories than we do of ours. It is as
if we deploy abstract or scientific notions of spatiality as a way of rooting them out of and
appropriating for ourselves the fields, meadows, fens, coulees, mountainsides, swamps, and
especially the prime real estate they occupy. Through manoeuvres such as this, we draw them
out of their geographical places and into rhetorical places and scientific-philosophical spaces in
our own minds. As I discovered while researching animals’ sense of place, even a significant
number of articles in the field of animal geographies that contain the word ‘place’ in their titles
or abstracts tend to treat animals’ use of places as symbolic and/or ideological placements
rather than material, physical locations.
The obverse is also true. That is, anthropocentrism also comes into play in our assumption that
our own sense of place is not related to nurture or satisfaction of our basic Maslovian needs.
While knowing the particulars of one’s territory is not necessarily tantamount to possessing a
sense of place, which implies feelings of belonging in or to that zone constructed out of
associations, memories, and stories, I think there is sufficient cause to extrapolate from
animals’ superb navigational and threat-avoidance capabilities based on their knowledge of the
geographies they inhabit to consider the possibility that they may also have a sense of place.
Consider how often a bear trucked or transported by helicopter sling far away from their home
range into unfamiliar territory returns like the repressed within forty-eight to seventy-two
hours.
A corresponding absence in most of our figurations of animals is the notion of the specificity of
individual animals’ lives, a lack I would attribute to our scepticism about their senses of place.
Our species chauvinism causes us to imagine our furry and feathery compatriots living lives
rendered typical, almost allegorical (a Richardson’s ground squirrel lives a species life, not the
life of a Richardson’s ground squirrel in Calgary or one in Grasslands National Park in
Saskatchewan). We believe that it is only emplaced lives in which history, event, or context can
develop. Even those who recognize that humans have profound and differential historical
effects upon other animals’ lives—through hunting, slaughter, factory farming, habitat
depletion, fencing, neutering, and many other practices—and critique such practices tend to
strand them in the zones of the typical and the timeless. Bear Awareness pamphlets, for
instance, tell us what to do in the event of being approached or attacked by a black bear as
opposed to a grizzly. While there is much validity to such categorizations and avoidance tactics,
individual bears’ distinct histories and circumstances also shape their characters, their lives, and
those of their offspring, and condition their responses to situations.
It is possible, I think, without imposing the doctrine of individualism (another form of
anthropocentrism) to acknowledge that not just every species but individual animals differ from
one another. As Charlie Russell in Grizzly Heart: Living Without Fear Among the Brown Bears of
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Kamchatka and Sid Marty in The Black Grizzly of Whiskey Creek show, bears, like humans, have
different experiences, histories, personalities, and moods. In an interview for the BBC Radio
program R3 Arts, oceanographer Sylvia Earle states that even fish show traces of individuality.
When she was growing up in Florida, she says, there were so many more creatures in the
ocean. Groupers, she says, would follow you around like puppy dogs when you were snorkeling,
and she realized that they are as much individuals as cats and dogs and horses are. Every fish is
different, she states; they have not just different faces, different arrangements of spots, stripes,
and other markings, but they actually do have independent personalities. Some, for example,
are more curious than others, some are more aggressive.
In short, there are a lot of intellectual and emotional challenges in working on animals and
animality, most of which when taken into account yield rich insights. Training in literary analysis
and cultural studies prepares one to analyze texts and, given the poststructuralist extension of
the notion of textuality beyond the book to other cultural phenomena, researchers in the
humanities or the arts can make valuable contributions to our understanding of more-thanhuman animals. Other-than-human animals have been the subjects of a wide range of texts and
oral discourses including but not restricted to the following: Indigenous song, prayer, chant,
story, pictograph, and petroglyph; the journals and diaries of so-called explorers and
naturalists; extinction narratives; accounts of life with a pet or other domestic animals;
memoirs of lives lived very close to nature such as narratives of backcountry living, the
recollections of guides and outfitters, and adventure narratives; anecdotes of first-hand
encounters; campfire stories; artistic expression such as poetry, photographs, paintings, literary
nonfiction, and the realistic wild animal story; newspaper stories and accounts of sightings,
encounters, and attacks; public safety pamphlets; cartoons and comic books; and medical and
healing narratives, all of which are susceptible to a text-based analysis. Working on animals
from within an arts/humanities discipline or across disciplines allows one to address such
documents, few of which scientists can afford to incorporate into their research without
drawing the suspicion and censure of their disciplinary colleagues. Textual, anecdotal, or
narrative evidence is typically avoided by scientists on the grounds that it cannot be quantified
or the results replicated. But what is an anecdote except an account of one’s field observations,
and while one must certainly be vigilant against bias and personal agendas, sentimentality, the
presence of the experimenter in proximity to animals, and other dangers mentioned above, a
great deal of knowledge can be obtained through anecdote, story, or narrative.
Conversely, a great deal of knowledge can be lost through denigrating, bracketing, or ignoring
such material. As Dean Bavington, author of Managed Annihilation: An Unnatural History of the
Newfoundland Cod Collapse, has shown in his work about the differences in perception
between fishers and fishery scientists with regard to the numbers of cod off the East Coast,
there are instances where folk knowledge in the form of anecdote is more reliable than
scientific reports. As Bavington notes, “The local ecological knowledge (LEK) of inshore cod
fishermen, once dismissed by fisheries managers as unscientific and anecdotal, is increasingly
embraced by and integrated into new forms of cod fisheries management” (73). While it may
be objected that researchers in the arts can only work with representations of more-thanhuman animals, so too our colleagues in fields such as biology, zoology, ecology, environmental
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studies, and environmental history work with representations of them. In addition to field
observations, even biologists—whose research may be based on some combination of fur,
tooth, hair, blood, or scat samples; DNA; tracks; photographs; and video images—are working
with documents or representations of animals. The hair of the bear is not the bear itself. It is a
part or fragment of a bear, a metonymy, specifically a synecdoche, but it is not a bear.
To take another example, radio or satellite tracking of a more-than-human animal creates
representations of its spatial movement. In Wired Wilderness: Technologies of Tracking and the
Making of Modern Wildlife, Etienne Benson writes that
Originating around 1960 at the unlikely intersection of wildlife management and military
surveillance technologies, the use of miniaturized radio tags and collars to keep track of
individual animals became virtually a sine qua non of wildlife research by the 1980s,
dominating the pages of professional publications such as the Journal of Wildlife
Management and serving as a symbol of modern wildlife conservation for observers of
the field. (2)
Not only do radio-tracking devices chart the movements of animals: they loop back upon and
track the tracking of the scientists too, thrusting them into an epistemology based on
transmission signals, graphs, maps, DNA analysis, and other technologies of representation. At
the same time, the tracking devices and interpretive practices become signifiers of science,
conservation, and management. Just as the device reveals, for instance, that a grizzly grazed on
grain spilled from a boxcar, it simultaneously transmits that science was practiced here.
However, just as reading animal behaviour is not confined to science and scientists neither is
such semiosis confined to humans. In his book The Others: How Animals Made Us Human, Paul
Shepard writes that
We [humans] were latecomers in a well-established process that had gone on for fifty
million years. The four-legged carnivores and their prey had long since learned that an
animal, watched long enough, gradually dissolved into signs. It left the marks that came
to represent it: footprints, urine, secretions, feces, molted antlers, scratchings and
rubbings, gnawed stems, bones, feathers, beds, diggings, nests, tracks, and bits of fur as
well as an immense range of sounds and smells unavailable to us. (24)
This is more or less a précis of what biologists do: observe an animal long enough for its signs to
become evident and assemble them in order to construct a thesis and argument, a likely story.
Shepard’s thesis is that it was through observation and mimicry of other animals that humans
developed survival tactics, including language and art. Other animals themselves were both
proto-scientists and artists. Indeed, maybe ‘the animal’ is the link between science and the arts.
As Ian McAllister describes in The Last Wild Wolves: Ghosts of the Great Bear Rainforest,
researchers chose not to tranquillize, capture, radio-collar, or touch any of the coastal wolves
they studied. Instead they collected only hair and scat samples for DNA analysis, took
photographs and video, and compiled journal entries. While admitting that some of the
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evidence of wolf and grizzly bear movements obtained through radio telemetry is
“fascinating,”McAllister advocates for a less invasive approach to study: “All that money spent
on helicopters and planes could have gone to field researchers, and when you have people in
the field, gathering data by direct observation, important information is gleaned that no
transmitter on an animal’s neck can duplicate. And regrettably, some bears died for the cause,
killed in the snares used to set the collars on them. It doesn’t get any more invasive than that”
(167). Using non-invasive techniques, the wolf researchers were able to track and identify
individual wolves and packs and to observe significant cultural differences among the various
packs, something one would be very hard pressed to do using helicopter surveillance and
invasive methods. This kind of research is much closer to research in the arts.
Many theoretical, political, disciplinary, practical, and personal challenges emerge as one
attempts to think with wild animals. From the methodologies of interdisciplinary scholarship
and the dangers of anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism, to relatively scant personal
experience with the wild animals in question, and a lack of basic training in biology or zoology,
researching and teaching about animals can be a formidable task, especially if one wishes to slip
the leg-hold trap of disciplinary limits in order to learn more about the lifeways of wolves and
bears on the basis of textual representations. However, pursuing this work is intensely
rewarding—even potentially transformative—and yields the basis for potential action and
activism on behalf of the wild. What kinds of knowledge about wild animals do literary
nonfiction accounts by naturalists, biologists, park wardens, and guides and outfitters
generate? How best can we learn to think not just about but with more-than-human animals?
An important area of discussion and debate about animals within both science and philosophy
is the question of animal minds: are animals capable of representational thinking, and can they
think about thinking? If assembling disparate signs into evidence of the presence or absence of
food, safety, relationship, home range, and other variables constitutes representational
thinking, as I would suggest it does, then doing science would be, in important ways, very
similar to being animal. Thinking is animal.
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